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Introduction
The notion of ring signature was put forth by Rivest et al. [16] in 2001. In such a scheme, anyone can sign a message on behalf of an ad-hoc created group (i.e. the ring) anonymously. In 2007, Chandran et al. [8] presented a novel approach to achieve a sub-linear size ring signature scheme without random oracles, with perfect anonymity in the common reference string model. Their scheme is proven secure under the Strong Diffie-Hellman and the Subgroup Decision assumptions, by setting the ring as a √ N × √ N matrix for N members. In this work, we aim to further reduce the size of a ring signature, which is a very challenging task.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we provide the first ring signature with logarithmic size without random oracles. To achieve our result, we extend the idea proposed by Chandran et al. [8] . We construct our scheme following their techniques using composite order groups with a bilinear map. We prove it secure under the Strong Diffie-Hellman and the Subgroup Decision assumptions. We obtain perfect anonymity in the common reference string model.
The crux of our scheme is that we achieve O(log 2 (N )) for the ring signatures size, where N is the number of members in the ring. In the following table, we compare our scheme with the one from Chandran et al.
[8] to highlight the difference in performance.
Scheme
Size of the common Size of the Number of elements Typical Values for k = 128 reference string ring signature in the signature N = 1, 000 N = 10, 000 N = 100, 000 Chandran et al.'s [8] O(k) O(k √ N ) 6 + 6 k √ N 24292 76806 242869 Our approach O(k) O(k log 2 (N )) 6 + 7 k log 2 (N ) 8935 11912 14888 Table 1 . Comparison of the size of the ring signature and the number of elements in the signature between Chandran et al.'s work [8] and ours, including the size of the common reference string. Let N be the number of members and k be the security parameter.
Our Technique
The novelty of our scheme is to construct the ring as a log 2 (N )-dimensional hypercube for N members, which yields a logarithmic size ring signature scheme. In [8] , a grid is picked such that the diameter is of the square root of the number of the points on the graph, i.e. √ N . In our paper, we consider the hypercube as a graph which has the smallest diameter for a given number of points. Thus, the diameter is of the logarithm of number of the points on the graph, i.e. log 2 (N ).
In our approach, we use a log 2 (N )-dimensional hypercube as a N -member ring to construct the signature.
Each verification key v in the ring is indexed by a d-bit string, denoted as
we need to follow the path formed by all the bits, from b 1 to b d . We obtain v as the vertex corresponding to
Moreover, the signature related to the verification key v has an equal size to the length of the path between two vertices of the hypercube, i.e. between two points of the graph. We illustrate the graph with N [7] constructed a scheme proved secure against adaptive chosen message attack without random oracles. In the same way, Bender et al. [4] suggested a scheme using generic ZAPs for NP in the standard model, but it seems impractical. In addition, Shacham and Waters [18] gave a linear size ring signature, whose security relies on the computational setting of the new definitions of [4] , without random oracles. Namely, they proposed a scheme anonymous against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect to insider corruption attacks. Finally, Boyen [5] proposed a construction of linear size in the common random string model with everlasting perfect anonymity. Schäge and Schwenk [17] constructed another ring signature scheme in the standard model using basic assumptions.
Preliminaries and Definitions

Negligible Function
Let negl(k) be a function in the security parameter k. We say that negl(k) is a negligible function if for all
Bilinear Composite Order Groups
Let BMGen be a randomized algorithm that outputs (p, q, G, G T , e, g) as follows:
-G and G T are multiplicative cyclic groups of order n = pq, -g is a generator of G,
-e : G × G → G T is an efficiently computable map such that: g) is a generator of G T whenever g is a generator of G,
-the group operations on G and G T can be performed efficiently.
Let G p and G q be the unique subgroups of G of orders p and q respectively. We recall that u → u q maps u into G p .
Boneh-Boyen Signature Scheme
Our approach is inspired by [8] , where the main ingredient of the construction is Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [2] , proved existentially unforgeable under weak chosen message attack based on the Strong DiffieHellman assumption.
As in [8] , one can translate the Boneh-Boyen's scheme into one in the composite group order model such that forging a signature in G p under weak chosen message attack is infeasible, based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption in G p . The Boneh-Boyen signature scheme consists of three algorithms:
-KeyGen: given a tuple (p, q, G, G T , e, g), pick at random sk ∈ R Z * n and compute v = g sk . The key pair is (v, sk).
-Sign: given a secret key sk ∈ Z * n and a message M ∈ {0, 1} l , output the signature δ = g 1 sk+M . By convention, 1/0 is defined to be 0, thus sk + M = 0 ⇒ δ = 1. We have l < |p|.
-Verify: given a public key v, a message M ∈ {0, 1} l and a signature δ ∈ G, verify that e(δ, vg M ) = e(g, g).
If equality holds, output "Accept"; otherwise "Reject".
Commitment and Encryption Schemes
The commitment/encryption scheme based on the Subgroup Decision assumption proposed in [3] is employed in our construction. The assumption is defined in the next section.
We construct a scheme where a public key v and an element h are description of the composite order group G. This element h is random and of order either n for perfect hiding commitment or q for encryption.
It implies that perfect hiding commitment keys look exactly the same as encryption keys.
Ring Signature Scheme
We define a ring signature scheme following [4, 8] .
Definition 1 (Ring Signature). A ring signature comprises four PPT algorithms as follows:
-Gen(1 k ): on input the security parameter k, outputs a common reference string λ. 
is equal to 1.
Security
Security Properties
Intuitively, we require that a ring signature (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) has perfect anonymity if a signature on message M under ring S and key v i 0 is indistinguishable from a signature on message M under ring S and key v i 1 . The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 2 (Perfect Anonymity). Given a ring signature (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify), a polynomial
N ( ), and a PPT adversary A, we consider the following game:
A chooses the ring of verification keys
S = {v 1 , · · · , v N (k) }, such that λ ← Gen(1 k ) and (v i , sk i ) ← KeyGen(λ), where i ∈ {1, · · · , N (k)}.
A is given access (throughout the entire game) to an oracle OSign, such that OSign(α, M, S) returns
Sign(λ, sk α , M, S), where v α ∈ S.
A outputs a message M , distinct indices i 0 , i 1 , and a ring S for which
v i 0 , v i 1 ∈ S (i.e. (v i 0 , sk i 0 ) and(v i 1 , sk i 1 ) have
been generated by the oracle KeyGen(λ)). A random bit b is chosen, and A is given the
signature δ ← Sign(λ, sk i b , M, S).
The adversary outputs a bit b , and succeeds if b = b.
A ring signature scheme achieves perfect anonymity, if for any PPT adversary A and any polynomial N ( ), the success probability of A in the above game is equal to 1/2.
We also require that a ring signature (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) is unforgeable (regarding insider corruption) if it is not feasible to forge a ring signature on a message without controlling one of the members in the ring.
Definition 3 (Computational Unforgeability). A ring signature (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) is computationally unforgeable if for any PPT adversary
A and any polynomial N ( ), the probability that A succeeds in the following game is negligible: 
A is given the ring of verification keys
A is given access to a generator oracle VKGen, where
VKGen(α, w α ) runs (v α , sk α ) ← KeyGen(λ, w α ), such
Assumptions Definition 4 (Subgroup Decision Assumption).
Given the generator BMGen, we define the following distribution:
e, g).
The Subgroup Decision assumption holds if there is a negligible function ε (in the security parameter k) so for any non-uniform polynomial time adversary A, we have:
P r[r ← Z * n ; h = g r : A(D, h) = 1] − P r[r ← Z * q ; h = g pr : A(D, h) = 1] ≤ ε(k).
Definition 5 (Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption).
Given the generator BMGen, we define the following distribution: 
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof
To prove that a statement is true, we can use a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof which is complete and sound, such that no interaction is needed between the prover and the verifier.
Using results in [11] providing short common reference string and non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK)
proofs for any NP language, Boyen and Waters [6] gave a NIZK proof for the statement γ = (
verified by e(c, g −1 )
?
= e(h, γ). For h of order n, the proof has perfect zero-knowledge as γ is determined from the verification equation and thus, no information is leaked from the proof. For h of order q, the verification enables us to show that e(c, g −1 ) has order q, that implies M = 0 mod p or M = 1 mod p.
In [12] , general methods are presented for constructing simple and efficient NIZK proofs over bilinear groups.
equal to either b i orb i (we only consider strings of bit-length d). Thus, we can retrieve the verification key graph whose diameter is the smallest for a given number of points, then the resulting signature is of length of the path between two points of the graph. We illustrate the methodology to reach v for hypercubes with N equal to 4 and 8 in Fig. 4 . δ a is the signer's certifying signature on vk OT , and A and B are perfectly hiding commitments to v a , δ a , respectively. γ B is a NIZK proof that A and B contain respectively a verification key and a signature on vk OT , using results from [11] .
The rest of the protocol is a NIZK proof that A contains v a ∈ S without revealing which one, using results from [6, 11] . 
which is a commitment to e(g, v b i ). 
Here,
proof that the content of A paired with g corresponds to the content in E.
1. Verify that δ OT is a one-time signature of M, S under v OT . = g. 6. If all the above steps verify correctly, then output "Accept"; otherwise, output "Reject".
Verify e(B, Ag vk
Compute E
b i = e(C b i , v b i )e(Cb i , vb i ). and verify E b i ? = e(g, D b i )e(h, γ D b i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d. 5. Compute E = e(D b d , C b d )e(Db
Security Proofs Theorem 1. The quadruple (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) is a ring signature scheme with perfect correctness, perfect anonymity and computational unforgeability under the Subgroup Decision assumption, the Strong
Diffie-Hellman assumption and given that the one-time signature is unforgeable.
Proof. Perfect correctness For λ ← Gen(1 k ), for (v, sk) ← KeyGen(λ), for any message M with respect to a ring S, we prove the perfect correctness by showing that the equalities in the algorithm Verify hold. = e(g, g)e(h, γ B ).
).
-Point 4. Verify the following equality E
-Point 5. Verify the following equality E ? = e(A, g)e(h, γ A ).
e(A, g)e(h, γ A ) = e(v a h r , g)e(h, g
−r )e(h,
g)e(h, g
Perfect anonymity. Following [6, 11, 12] , we will prove that our scheme is secure in the anonymity game against adaptively chosen message attacks. Informally, the perfect anonymity comes from two intuitive arguments. First, for sk OT ∈ R Z * n , vk OT = g sk OT , and for some message M , δ OT = g 1 sk OT +M , meaning that vk OT and δ OT are similarly generated, regardless which signing key is used. Second, all the commitments are perfectly hiding and the proofs are perfectly zero-knowledge, when h has order n.
In addition, an adversary can tell whether h is a random generator of G q or G with negligible probability using a reduction proof based on the Subgroup Decision problem.
We assume there exist a simulator B that plays the Subgroup Decision problem with probability Adv B
and an adversary A that wants to break the anonymity of the above ring signature scheme. In the game G 0 , the simulator computes h as an element in G and in the game G 1 , it computes h as an element in G q . We denote the adversary's advantage in these games as Adv A and Adv A,G 1 , respectively.
We consider a simulator B receiving the Subgroup Decision challenge λ = (n, G, G T , e, g, h). It then creates the public parameters as in the real scheme, and sends the parameters to an adversary A and plays the anonymity game with it. If h ∈ G, then A plays the normal game G 0 . If h ∈ G q , then A plays the hybrid game G 1 . We assume that B is able to reply all the adaptively chosen message queries, i.e. it is able to issue the signing keys for any user and to sign any message by any user, since it knows the challenge λ.
At some point, A chooses one message M and two identities i 0 and i 1 it wishes to be challenged on.
We assume that the adversary had not previously made a signing key query on i x . B creates a challenge signature on M , and A guesses the identity of the signer. If A answers correctly, then the simulator outputs b = 1, meaning that h is guessed to be in G. Otherwise, it outputs b = 0, meaning that h is guessed to be in G q .
We denote the simulator's advantage as Adv B in the Subgroup Decision game.
, we obtain that:
The result comes from that Adv B must be smaller than ε due to the hardness of the assumption.
Next, in the real scheme, when h belongs to G q instead of G, the challenge signature is statistically independent of the signer's identity in the adversary's view: we will determine what the adversary may deduce from δ.
First, we observe that vk OT , δ OT , A, B, γ B do not depend on the signer identity. However, since A is computationally unbounded, we assume that these values reveal some information relative to the exponents. 
Thus, we obtain that γ
for each i ∈ {1, · · · , d} does not reveal no information about the bit b i , and therefore, it does not reveal the identity of the signer. Therefore, the identity is statistically independent of the entire signature δ, that means Adv A,G 1 = 0.
Thus, we obtain that Adv A ≤ 2ε.
Computational unforgeability. Following [6, 11, 12] , our scheme is proved computationally unforgeable with relation to insider corruption. Informally, under the Subgroup Decision assumption, the probability that the forgery happens when we switch from h of order n in a common reference string to h of order q is negligible. The commitments are now perfectly binding in G p and the NIZK proofs are perfectly sound in G p , and therefore some uncorrupted v a ∈ S is contained in A and a signature δ a on vk OT under v a is contained in B. We carefully develop this part in the proof below. Next, by the properties of the one-time signature scheme, vk OT has not been used in any other signature and thus, δ a is a forged Boneh-Boyen signature on vk OT . We omit this part since the proof is quite straightforward: Boneh and
Boyen [2] showed that this probability is negligible under the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
We assume there exists a simulator B that plays the Subgroup Decision problem with probability Adv B
and an adversary A that wants to break the unforgeability of the above ring signature scheme. B proceeds to simulate the oracle queries of A as follows.
-When A requests a signature on a message M , with respect to ring S (S might contain some verification keys generated in an arbitrary manner by A), to be signed by user a =ã, then B can easily generate the response to this query by running the Sign algorithm in a honest manner.
-When A requests a signature on message M , with respect to ring S (S might contain some verification keys generated in an arbitrary manner by A), to be signed by userã, then B cannot directly respond to this query since it does not have the appropriate secret key forã (we recall that vã = g skã for some unknown skã). Instead, B submits M to its signing oracle and obtains in return a signature for a. The remainder of the signature is calcultated as in the real scheme using h. makes a corruption query forã, then B simply aborts.
At some point, A outputs a forgery If h ∈ G as in the game G 0 , then B provides a perfect simulation for the adversary A since the signature given to B is as in the real game. Otherwise (i.e. h ∈ G q as in the game G 1 ), then the forgery is uniformly distributed in G q and independent of the random choices made by B. We recall that the simulator's advantage is Adv B ≤ ε 1 in the Subgroup Decision game.
, we obtain the following.
Now in the game G 1 , the commitments are perfectly binding in G p and the NIZK proofs are perfectly sound in G p . We show these results for the commitments C b i , the other commitments following a similar demonstration. We recall that
is uniquely determined from the verification equation, the proof has perfectly zero-knowledge.) When h ∈ G q , the verification shows that e(C b i , C b i g −1 ) has order q. Since this happens for all the commitments and the corresponding NIZK proofs, there is a honest user a with uncorrupted signing public key vk a ∈ S such that A * = vk a h r and so there is a signer's certifying signature δ a on vk OT such that B * = δ a h s .
In other words, if A outputs a valid forgery, then with all but negligible probability ε 2 by soundness of NIZK, it holds that δ * is a valid signature of M * regarding v a for some a. From this, with probability 1/N , we get that the event [B did not abort ∧ δ * is a valid signature of M * regarding vã forã] occurs.
Therefore, the advantage of the adversary in the game G 1 is
Afterwards, the forgery δ * on M * implies a forgery of the Boneh-Boyen signature. More precisely, A contains a verification key that is not corrupted and B contains a signature on vk OT under this verification key. We recall that the probability of the event [vk OT has not been used in any other signature]
is negligible based on the properties of the one-time signature scheme and the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. For simplicity, we do not count this part in our security analysis.
We conclude that the adversary succeeds with probability Adv A ≤ ε 1 + N · ε 2 .
Working in Prime Order Groups
We work in composite order groups in our construction. The anonymity relies on the hardness of the Subgroup Decision assumption. This assumption is as follows: given a group G of composite order n = pq, it is hard to decide whether a given element g ∈ G is in the subgroup of order p without knowing p and q. It has to be infeasible to factor n to achieve this hardness. This results in very large parameter sizes, e.g. log 2 n = 3072 or 3248 for a 128-bit security level, according to NIST or ECRYPT II recommendations [13] .
Extending our scheme in prime order groups would be an interesting challenge to gain in efficiency.
In addition, the pairing computation seems to be much slower in the composite order setting than in the prime order setting. We reckon that there are useful properties for bilinear composite order models to design protocols, however the latters are not very competitive compared to the protocols relying on other assumptions such that prime order models with asymetric pairings.
Recently, Groth et al. [12] have shown that their NIWI and NIZK techniques can be realized in prime order groups under the Decision Linear problem. We could apply these results in our ring signature protocol to obtain a scheme in prime order groups.
